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Abstract. We assess the impact of legislation mandating the plain packaging of cig-
arettes in 2012 in Australia on both primary and secondary demand. We ﬁrst examine
the causal impact of the legislation at the cigarette category level by comparing the
changes in sales before and after legislation with the corresponding changes in sales in
a comparable market, New Zealand, where the plain packaging mandate (PPM) was
not imposed. Our results suggest a decline in sales due to the PPM of around 67 million
units (sticks) per month, representing around 7.5% of the market. Our results on the
mechanism using brand-level sales data from Australia suggest reduced differentiation after
the PPM, with higher price sensitivity. Premium and mainstream brands’ price sensitivities
are most affected after the PPM, but we also ﬁnd channel-speciﬁc differences, with grocery
(convenience) channels showing an increase (a decline) in post-PPM short-term price
sensitivity. Because the government has some control over price through excise taxes,
understanding changes in price sensitivities provides guidance to health authorities on the
relative impacts of price- and non-price-related policy on cigarettes sales. We also explore
other public policy implications of our results, such as the expected reduction in sales per
month we might see in New Zealand due to their instituting a PPM.
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1. Introduction
The tobacco industry has seen a progressive tight-
ening of regulatory interventions in various coun-
tries, with the primary aim to reduce and/or control
tobacco consumption. Interventions include over-the-
counter display and sales controls, advertising bans of
tobacco products, introduction of health-warning la-
bels on tobacco packaging, smoking bans in public
places, and sales tax increases. A number of researchers
suggest that, historically, many of these initiatives
have been successful in reducing tobacco consumption
(Levy et al. 2004, Capella et al. 2011). However, the
degree of success achieved by thesemeasures in terms
of reducing smoking rates has also been questioned by
others (Capella et al. 2011). Overall, regulatory bodies
have tended to accept the effectiveness of advertising
controls and price increases as mechanisms by which
to reduce cigarette consumption (e.g., U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services 2010, p. 652), leading
to what is described as a “dark market” (Dewhirst
2012, p. 516), that is, one largely devoid of manufac-
turer communication stimuli (Burton et al. 2015).
Despite the regulatory interventions that have greatly
limited marketing activities, tobacco marketers still
have some control over one effective marketing com-
munication tool: packaging. Given the dark market,
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the branding elements on packaging are said to be key
marketing communication tools for tobacco products
(Ford et al. 2012), and packaging is considered a
source of added value to the consumers (Wakeﬁeld
et al. 2002). As part of this, trademarks on tobacco
packaging have played a major market role as the
legal properties that protect distinctiveness and thus
help identify and differentiate competing products.
A leading example is the Marlboro brand, regularly
identiﬁed as the most highly valued tobacco brand in
the world (Millward Brown 2018) and of signiﬁcant
visibility and recognition for both the smoking and
nonsmoking public. Unsurprisingly, therefore, recent
policy propositions for further restricting available
marketing communication tools have focused on regu-
lating trademarks and the packaging of tobacco prod-
ucts (Ford et al. 2012).
The primary objective of this paper is to examine
empirical evidence on the impact of the plain pack-
aging mandate (PPM) on the demand for tobacco
products in Australia. FromDecember 1, 2012, Australia
became the ﬁrst country to introduce plain packaging
for all tobacco brands sold at retail. The PPM requires
that marketers in this category adopt package designs
that make use of a uniform background color (“drab
matte brown”), use a standard font for the brand and
variant names, and to contain graphic health warn-
ings that cover 75% of the pack (enlarged from 30%).
This is in the context of an industry that has already
been restricted from using other branding elements
(including point-of-sale displays).1
We study the effects of the PPM on cigarette sales
using a quasi experiment and based on a difference-
in-differences (DiD) analysis (see Angrist and Pischke
2008) with the neighboring country of New Zealand
(NZ) as a control market over the time period from
January 2011 to December 2013. Whilst Australia in-
stituted the PPM, NZ maintained the status quo and
continued to allow marketers to leverage the beneﬁts
of packaging as a branding element. As we shall show
later, NZ shares many of the features of Australia. Thus,
NZservesas aplausible controlgroup forAustralia.Our
key identifying assumption is that sales of cigarettes in
NZ, not being subject to the PPM, are a valid counter-
factual for the sales that would have been obtained in
Australia in the absence of the PPM (conditional on the
variety of controls that we include in the analysis).
As our central result, an estimated decline inmonthly
baseline sales of around 67 million sticks is attributable
to the PPM. In the Australian market at the time of the
PPM implementation, this represents a 7.5% decline
in monthly baseline sales. This result is robust to the
following: (1) alternative functional form assumption
for our analysis, (2) a shorter time period, (3) a placebo
treatment, and (4) potential endogeneity of one of our
control variables, category price. We estimate that the
decline in smoking of 67 million sticks per month is the
rough equivalence of the amount smoked by around
135,000 average usage smokers (in a population of ap-
proximately 23 million people in 2012).2 With an esti-
mated two-thirds of smokers dying prematurely of
smoking-related diseases (Banks et al. 2015) and the
world population of smokers being approximately 1 bil-
lion,3 a global rollout of plain packaging policies with
success similar to that which we ﬁnd for Australia
could indicatively deliver a reduction in premature
human deaths due to smoking ofwell over 50million.
Going beyond our product category analyses, we
aim to understand possible mechanisms underlying
our above results. Our hypothesis is that plain pack-
aging reduces differentiation between the various
brands, thereby raising price sensitivity (and affecting
sensitivity to othermarketing activities, such as variants
being offered by the brands). In testing this hypothesis,
we run into challenges associated with our data. Micro-
level (consumer-level) data are not available for our two
countries, so heterogeneous effects across consumers or
segments cannot be explored. Furthermore, brand- and
channel-level aggregate data are not available fromNZ.
Instead, we turn to aggregate brand-level data from
Australia to examine whether sensitivity to prices and to
the shares of variants accounted for by the various
brands changed after the PPM. We recognize that any
ﬁndings from these data are likely to be suggestive
rather than causal because of the absence of an explicit
control group.
The results also indicate that after the PPM, partic-
ularly for premium and mainstream products, both
short- and long-term price sensitivity increase. In terms
of brand variant shares, our evidence does not suggest
that brands change in their responsiveness to the var-
iant share after the PPM. Furthermore, our evidence
suggests differences across channels in howmuch price
sensitivity increases, with price sensitivity for con-
venience channels actually declining in the short term.
Given that the grocery channel accounts for most (over
60%) of the category share, average price sensitiv-
ity increases across these channels. The higher price
sensitivity we observe after the PPM carries impor-
tant implications for public policy. It is well known
that price levels are heavily inﬂuenced by excise tax
policy (Wang et al. 2015), meaning that after the PPM,
the effect of the public policy sword of excise taxes on
sales may be considerably sharper. Although our
ﬁndings do not permit us to attribute this observation
to the PPM, this effect is potentially of considerable
importance, because public policy typically relies on
multiple instruments. This paper, we believe, is the
ﬁrst to document a possible synergistic impact of
such policies with those associated with packaging.
In 2018, NZ also introduced a PPM. We use our re-
sults to provide a benchmark for policymakers in that
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country on the reduction in cigarette sales due to such
a mandate.
Our above ﬁndings that pertain to measuring the
impact of the removal of packaging-based differen-
tiation in this dark market allows us to make a
number of contributions:
1. Because many other countries since have ei-
ther adopted or are considering the adoption of plain
packaging for tobacco products, providing evidence
on its likely impact is of high value to policy makers
andmarketers. The debate about whether to mandate
plain packaging or not will ultimately be driven by
the accumulating evidence on its impacts, assessed
by challenges in judicial institutions and trade or-
ganizations (e.g., theWorld Trade Organization). The
body of knowledge informing these debates is com-
plemented by our ﬁndings.
2. In terms of the data and methodology used,
those in our study differ from those used in previous
research in important ways. Our study is the ﬁrst to
assess the impact on sales (rather than, for example, self-
reports). The closest published evidence is an event study
by Diethelm and Farley (2015) that examines the
impact of plain packaging on smoking prevalence
measured with survey data.4 Although that study is
an important step in contributing to our overall un-
derstanding of the PPM, the use of survey data could
lead to biased estimates of the effects of PPM because
respondents’ stated behavior could differ from their
actual actions. As part of our contribution, and in contrast
with Diethelm and Farley (2015), we examine actual
sales data to compare the difference in sales before
and after the PPM to that in an appropriate “control”
market, that is, NZ, that did not have the PPM at that
time. In doing so, we also control for the effects of
retail prices. With survey data, one might also be con-
cerned about heterogeneity in scale usage (see Gilula
et al. 2006). Furthermore, it is useful to study actual
sales behavior, rather than self-reported prevalence
data, to ascertain the effect on actual demand for
cigarettes and the corresponding price elasticities.
3. Our ﬁndings provide insights into the role pack-
aging plays in differentiated consumer goods. Pack-
aging (and package communication) has long been
understood to play a signiﬁcant role in the consumer
evaluation and decision process (Meyers and Lubliner
1998), particularly in the absence of other manufac-
turer communication vehicles. While packaging has
been argued to be a critical driver of choice, empirical
studies evaluating the role that packaging plays in
sales response are limited (for an exception, see
Vanclay et al. 2011). This study thereby augments the
limited empirical evidence available on sales response
to packaging changes. In addition, that plain packaging
has been adopted in an environment where there is
no confound from other branding elements presents a
rare opportunity to isolate the role of packaging from
that of other branding elements.
This paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst discuss
the evidence available to regulatory authorities prior
to the PPM as to whether plain packaging would be
likely to affect brand and category sales and price
sensitivity. From there, we move to the data we have
for the window of time during which plain packag-
ingwas introduced. Our empirical analysis involves a
difference-in-differences analysis using data from
Australia and having NZ as a control group. In the
second half of our empirical analysis, we focus on the
Australian market and delve deeper into quality seg-
ment sales response models before and after the PPM.
Our discussion and conclusion sections reﬂect upon
our ﬁndings and draw some possible implications for
public policy and for marketers more generally.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Evidence of the Likely Efﬁcacy of Plain
Packaging Prior to Its Introduction
We brieﬂy review the weight of evidence available
prior to the introduction of plain packaging, which, in
the absence of data, suggests the types of impact that
the regulator and the regulated might expect. This
evidence is both general (what we know about pack-
aged goods as a whole) and speciﬁc (what we know
about the cigarette category speciﬁcally).
Packaging may have a number of features including
slogans (Elder and Krishna 2009); colors (Morrot et al.
2001); physical attributes such as size, images, or logos
(e.g., Bruce et al. 2013); fonts (e.g., Henderson et al.
2004); and brand names, including descriptors (e.g.,
adjectives like smooth, low tar, etc.; see Gilpin et al.
2002). A consumer may value these features directly
(i.e., ﬁnd the package attractive) or may infer other
attributes from them. Valued attributes inﬂuence the
likelihood that those contemplating starting smoking
will start, a smoker whowishes to quit will quit, and a
quitter tempted to relapse will relapse. As discussed,
there is little empirical evidence in the academic lit-
erature of sales response to packaging changes, but
industry sources suggest that it may be inﬂuential
(e.g., Nielsen Corporation 2015).
Past work in this area has largely focused on two
information theory–based themes regarding how
packaging can inﬂuence category demand and choice
among brands: the role in communication and the
role in social inﬂuence.
2.1.1. The Role of Packaging in Communication. Pack-
aging can be a powerful form of communication of
a brand’s value proposition, product personality, or
function (e.g., see Klimchuk and Krasovec 2006, p. 33)
Keller (1993) describes “Customer-based brand eq-
uity” as the value added to the product by knowledge
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of the brand. Much of this knowledge may be infer-
red, and one major form of this inference occurs
between a product’s features, packaging and other
marketing communication messages, and the attri-
butes and beneﬁts that the consumer sees it providing
(e.g., Huber and McCann 1982). For example, Garber
et al. (2000) demonstrate the associations evoked by
different colored packaging in four packaged good
categories.
2.1.2. Social Inﬂuence of Packaging. In addition to
direct effects on the consumer, packaging can also play
a role in consumer learning via social inﬂuence. Pack-
aging has been shown to play a role in adding value in
the user’s possession, and also as a mechanism for
social inﬂuence (Argo and White 2012). The social
information role is likely to affect competing brands
in the market differentially. With market share driv-
ing the probability that a person observes a speciﬁc
brand, the likelihood of choosing the market leader
may be partially determined by inferred popularity
signals, driving contagion not linked to any objective
quality of the brand (e.g., Tucker and Zhang 2011).
With plain packaging, the number of touch points
with the company’s branding elements reduces dra-
matically. This shuts down an important mode of
communication among consumers: observable qual-
ity signals (e.g., Zhang 2010), as it relies on consumers
discussing product attributes without tangible re-
inforcements. Thus, information transfer through
social channels may be reduced, further eroding the
signal value available through brand equity.
2.1.3. Response of Cigarette Category Speciﬁcally to
Package Redesign. There is some direct econometric
evidence of the effect of changes in pack design in
the cigarette category speciﬁcally with respect to the
introduction of graphic health warnings (GHWs).
For example, Huang et al. (2014), using the United
States as a control for Canada, estimated a 2.9 to 4.7
percentage point decline in smoking prevalence as a
result of the introduction of GHWs. However, al-
though the majority of studies tend to support the
conclusion that they have an effect, others suggest
that those effects may be minor (e.g., Bardsley and
Olekalns 1999). There are also some laboratory ex-
periments that test the effect of plain packaging on
perceptions and appeal. These studies tend to con-
clude that plain packaging is associated with negative
associations (e.g., less attractive taste) and lower ap-
peal (e.g., Wakeﬁeld et al. 2008).
2.1.4. Response of Cigarette Brand Shares and Elas-
ticities to Package Redesign. Perhaps because most
of the literature on the PPM intervention is focused
on the public health perspective, and thus category
demand, there is relatively little literature or empir-
ical research on how brand shares, market structure,
and brand prices might be impacted by it. The general
consensus seems to be that plain packaging is likely
to lower perceived differentiation between brands,
and thus lead to lower prices and higher price elas-
ticities (e.g., Freeman et al. 2008).
2.2 Past Work Examining Plain Packaging
In attempting to assess the effect of the Australian
government’s plain packaging measure on cigarette
usage, we ﬁrst examine prior research on this topic.
We review three sources: (1) a monthly survey com-
mencing eight months prior to the measure’s introduc-
tion and continuing for two years after (the Australian
National Tobacco Plain Packaging Tracking Survey
[NTPPTS]), (2) a monthly omnibus tracking survey
conducted by the market research company Roy Mor-
gan, and (3) sales (scanner) data provided by Nielsen
Research. The NTPPTS was designed to measure the
effectiveness of the measure in achieving intermedi-
ate goals such as decreasing the appeal of cigarettes,
increasing the visibility of graphic health warnings,
etc.), rather than its effect on consumption. Although
Wakeﬁeld et al. (2002) show that PPMwill be likely to
be largely effective in achieving those goals, they are
silent as to whether it was associated with any change
in tobacco consumption.
The Australian market research ﬁrm Roy Morgan
ran a syndicated survey of cigarette smoking preva-
lence rates on a sample of approximately 4,500 re-
spondents aged 14 and older prior and subsequent to
the plain packaging measure (as well as other cate-
gory usage). These data were ﬁrst analyzed by Kaul
and Wolf (2014) under contract for Philip Morris,
ﬁnding no evidence of a decrease in smoking prev-
alence attributable to plain packaging. This working
paper has attracted considerable controversy partly be-
cause of process (it did not acknowledge that Philip
Morris had the right to vet its contents or that the terms
of the contract with Philip Morris should be kept secret)
and partly because of methodological issues (see,
e.g., Doward 2015). Although a review of the paper
commissioned by the University of Zurich suggested
that the working paper not be withdrawn (Jann 2015),
the review’s author did add “Although I am not
happywith all aspects of the papers (see, e.g., Section 2),
I do not think that the papers are fundamentally
ﬂawed from a methodological point of view. I do not
suggest their retraction. There is some space for im-
provement and some of the interpretations by Kaul
and Wolf might be challenged” (Jann 2015, p. 45).
In a peer-reviewed paper reanalyzing Kaul and
Wolf’s (2014) data, Diethelm and Farley (2015)
modiﬁed some of Kaul and Wolf’s (2014) assump-
tions (e.g., that the trend of smoking prevalence in
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Australia was occurring independent of previous
policy changes) and reached a different conclusion.
Using what they considered to be more realistic as-
sumptions, they identiﬁed a statistically signiﬁcant
decrease in smoking prevalence of 3.7% coincident with
the introduction of plain packaging. In a report for the
Australian government, an independent econometric
consultant (Chipty 2016) found similar results using
these data, a decrease in prevalence of 0.55 percentage
points (which, given smoking prevalence at the time
of 17.77% amounts to a 3.1% decrease in prevalence
rates coincident with the change (0.0055/0.1777 =
0.031). This report has since been challenged by
Davidson and Silva (2018). Rather than looking for
changes in prevalence at the time of the measure,
Davidson and Silva (2018) looked for evidence of a
break in the series and failed to ﬁnd one in December
2012. Perhaps, given the gradual effect of any inter-
vention on the addictive behavior of smokers, these
two studies may not be as at odds as they appear.
The controversy about the effectiveness of the
plain packaging measure using Roy Morgan data gives
us the opportunity to consider the issue using a fur-
ther set of data, point-of-sale retail scanner data from
Nielsen Research. This also allows us to move beyond
the limitations of self-reports to objectively measure
sales and to look at usage volumes rather than just num-
ber of users. For reasons we will discuss, our data win-
dow is limited to the dates surrounding the PPM date of
implementation, from January of 2011 up to December
of 2013, with the PPM being implemented in December
of 2012. Notwithstanding this limited window of time,
the Australian government (and other governments)
needs to make policy decisions with respect to plain pack-
aging and its interaction with other policy instruments.
In keeping with the objectives of this special issue, our
aim is to give the best possible analysis on which to base
that policy, within the limitations of the data available.
3. Data
3.1. Australian Data
We have scanner data available from AC Nielsen
representing retail transaction sales in Australia. Our
retail sales data represent the total amount that
smokers buy in any given period for the two largest
distribution channels, grocery stores (supermarkets)
and convenience stores/forecourt retailers combined.
In 2012, these channels collectively accounted for 72.3%
of total sales volume per year (Euromonitor Passport
2018a). The remaining 28% is accounted for primar-
ily by specialist tobacco retailers and “independent
small grocers,” for which detailed scanner data are
not available.
Australia comprises six states, and the data are
aggregated across these states. There are 42 brands in
our database, and for each brand we have unit sales
volume (measured as the number of cigarette sticks),
revenues, number of variants per brand, and average
transacted retail prices per brand for each four-week
period spanning from January 2011 to the end of
December 2013 (a total of 39 four-week periods).
Henceforth, we will refer to the four-week periods as
“months,” as distinct from the use of the term “calendar
months.” The PPM required all tobacco products to be
in the new packaging format after December 1, 2012.
All monetary amounts are measured in Australian
currency (AUD),5 unless stated otherwise, and are de-
ﬂated by the Australian Consumer Price Index (CPI,
all products), with a base year set to 2009, at 100.
3.2. New Zealand Data
We collected a comparable time series for category-
level demand of cigarettes and prices for NZ, which,
as we will discuss, is a country similar to Australia on
a number of key dimensions but wherein no plain
packaging policy existed at the time. This second data
set, collected from the Tobacco Control Data Re-
pository6 in NZ, is also Nielsen data and represents
cigarette sales in units from channels comparable to
those contained in the Australian data set (super-
markets, smaller convenience outlets). The NZ data
include sales units and retail prices on a four-week
basis from January 2011 to the end of December 2013.
For NZ data, currency values (including excise taxes)
are deﬂated by the CPI and converted to Australian
dollars to allow for comparison. In July of 2012, NZ
implemented a display ban—the absence of special
displays of tobacco products in stores. Such a banwas
already in effect in Australia over the entire duration
of our data. In the analysis, we explicitly control for
the effects of this ban and also assess the robustness
of our results to the inclusion of only postban data.
4. Plain Packaging as a Quasi Experiment
Our setting involves a quasi experiment, starting in
December of 2012, when Australia implemented a ban
on all branding elements on the packaging of cigarettes.
This is an exogenous shock to demand, as it was set by
the government, rather than, for example, in response to
consumer demand for an absence of packaging. It also
affected all brands simultaneously, across all channels
of distribution and product types. This was against the
backdrop of long-standing policy against any form
of marketing communication other than packaging, in-
cluding advertising, displays at point of sale, and digital
communications (e.g., websites).
4.1. New Zealand as a Control for Australia
We assess how New Zealand is a suitable control for
Australia in several ways. First is a set of qualitative
assessments on similarities between Australia and
NZ. The use of NZ as a control for Australia is well
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established (e.g., see Murphy 1999). Hofstede (2001,
exhibit 2.9) shows that Australia and NZ are very
similar with respect to a number of economic con-
ditions, including per-capita gross domestic product
(GDP), economic growth, and population. Hofstede’s
(2001) clustering of nations based on cultural simi-
larities uncovers 12 clusters, with Australia and NZ
falling into the same cluster (along with the United
Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Ireland). An
examination of cultural dimensions (power distance,
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity/
femininity, and long/short-term orientation; see
Hofstede 2001, exhibit A5.1) reveals a similar close-
ness between Australia and the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada, NZ, and (to a lesser extent) Ire-
land relative to the other 44 countries calibrated. We
also compared Australia and NZ on Schwartz’s di-
mensions of conservatism, hierarchy, mastery, af-
fective autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarian
commitments, and harmony (included in Hofstede
2001, exhibit 5.17). Of the 26 countries reported, NZ
(along with the United States, Netherlands, Brazil,
Mexico, and Poland) is considerably more culturally
similar to Australia than are the other 20 countries.
Second, Table 1 more formally compares a variety
of metrics to assess the similarity. In particular, the
table shows remarkable similarities in prevalence of
smoking as well as the nature of regulation (other
Table 1. NZ is a Suitable Control Country for a Difference-in-Differences Model
Descriptor Australia New Zealand
Smokingprevalence (EuromonitorPassport2018c)
Males (%) 19.3 19.4
Females (%) 16.7 18.3
Tobacco sale regulation No advertising, promotion, sponsorship; no smoking
in public places; health warning on packs; no
display of packs at retail; heavy use of excise taxes
Annual rate of population change (%) 1.1 0.86
Life expectancy, male (at birth) 79.5 79.3
Life expectancy, female 84.5 83
% population +65 years 14.7 14.2
% population <15 years 18.1 19.9
CPI annual change 2.4 0.7
Unemployment (% of labor force) 5.2 5.4
Employment (% of those aged 15–64) 72.3 72.1
Average annual hours worked 1,762 1,683
Shopping access, supermarkets 6 days a week (less on
Sunday)
6 days a week (less on
Sunday)
Convenience 7 days a week 7 days a week
Fraser’s World Rankingsa
% home ownership 65 66
Overall economic freedom ranking 8.2 8.48
Size of government 6.57 6.48
Legal system and property rights 8.02 8.72
Sound money 9.26 9.46
Freedom to trade internationally 7.71 8.64
Regulation 8.52 9.16
Hofstede (2001) dimensionsb
Power distance 36 22
Individualism 90 79
Masculinity 61 58
Uncertainty avoidance 51 49
Long-term orientation 21 33
Indulgence 71 75
Schwartz scoresb
Conservatism 4.06 3.73
Hierarchy 2.36 2.38
Mastery 4.09 4.23
Affective autonomy 3.50 3.98
Intellectual autonomy 4.12 4.36
Egalitarian commitment 4.98 5.15
Harmony 4.05 3.99
aData are from the Fraser Institute’s World Rankings of countries’ economic freedom and contributory
factors (Fraser Institute 2018).
bHofstede (2001) dimensions and Schwartz scores are based on product-moment correlations of
Schwartz’s culture-level scores on seven value dimensions of teachers (Hofstede 2001).
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than PPM) across the two countries, and along a se-
ries of demographic and economic conditions. The
one key distinction appears to be in the CPI metric
across countries. To the extent that we control for
prices in the analysis, we are able to accommodate this
particular deviation. Taken together, the qualitative
and themore quantitative similarities provide uswith
some reassurance that our choice of NZ as a control
group is reasonable.
Third, using available data, we assess pre-PPM de-
mand patterns to establish evidence of the common
trend assumption. First, we note that from Figure 1,
visual inspection suggests that the time series for the
two countries before PPM exhibit very similar patterns,
including trend and seasonality. A possible exception
is where the lines diverge prior to the PPM date, and
prior to the 12.5% excise tax late in 2013. We speculate
that this may be due to other factors. We did look for
other possible inﬂuential factors in these periods, but
were unable to identify any speciﬁc omitted variables.
To assess the strength of linear correlation, we
estimate the Pearson correlation (ρ) between the two
countries’ sales series in the pre-PPM period, that is,
from January 2011 up to December 2012. The esti-
mated correlation is r = 0.68, with a 95% conﬁdence
interval (CI) of [0.39, 0.85]. The estimated correlations
using shorter data series are higher. Using data prior to
the NZ display ban it is 0.76 with 95% CI = [0.47, 0.90],
and using data from the display ban until PPM it
is 0.86 with 95% CI = [0.15, 0.98]. Although these
numbers suggest strong correlation, unsurprisingly
they reject the null hypothesis that ρ = 1. Therefore, the
raw data per se do not exhibit common linear trends.
To further investigate this issue, we test the associ-
ation after controlling for other concomitant factors in
the data. This more focused hypothesis test of the
presence of a common linear trend in the data prior to
the PPM is given in Table 2, columns (1)–(5). We
return to a discussion of column (6) in the robust-
ness checks section. In particular, we regress the
stacked Australia and NZ sales series in the pretreat-
ment period on a number of controls, a time trend,
a dummy variable for Australia (OZd), and the in-
teraction between the time trend and the Australia
dummy. NZ invoked a display ban in July of 2012.
Because this represents a signiﬁcant shift in policy
relevant to the PPM it must be accommodated in the
analysis as one of the controls. If the common linear
trends assumption is satisﬁed, then the coefﬁcient on
the interaction term Time trend × OZd would not be
statistically different from zero. In the absence of any
controls, there seems to be some (weak) evidence of an
interaction (although not signiﬁcant at p< 0.05). The
inclusion of controls makes the effect decline and
weakens the statistical signiﬁcance. With a full set of
controls (model (5) in Table 2), the estimate of the
interaction Time trend × OZd also declines in mag-
nitude (and is statistically insigniﬁcant), which as-
sures us that conditional on the various controls, the
common linear trends assumption is satisﬁed in the
data (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Note the small
negative (but not statistically signiﬁcant) effect of the
October–December DiD term, suggesting that the
manufacturing ban implemented in that period had
a negligible impact on sales prior to the PPM date of
December 2012.
4.2. Difference-in-Differences Analysis
We need to measure the sales difference (if any) due
to the Australian PPM policy implemented in December
2012 comparedwith the sales difference (before versus
after) of the control market (NZ). Our ﬁnal data series
therefore spans from January 2011 to the end of De-
cember 2013. To formally estimate the DiD effect,
we can use linear regression (see, e.g., Angrist and
Pischke 2008, Goldfarb and Tucker 2014) allowing us
to control for several effects. The full speciﬁcation that
provides us with a DiD estimator is
Salesit λ0 + λ1OZdi + T(i, t,Γ)
+ λ2PPt + λ3DBt + λ4 OZdi ×DBt( )
+ λ5 OZdi × PPt( )
+ λ6Priceit + λ7Salesit−1 + it, (1)
Figure 1. (Color online) NZ and Australian Sales Volume
(in Sticks) Time Series from 2011 to 2014, with Data Prior to
the PPM Showing Similar Patterns Across the Two
Countries
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with Salesit in month t being category unit sales vol-
ume for country i ∈ {NZ,OZ}, with NZ being NZ and
OZ being Australia. The term OZdi is an indicator
variable for Australia (equal to 1 if i  OZ), PPt an
indicator for the PPM (equal to 1 after PPM), and DBt
an indicator for the NZ display ban (equal to 1 after
the display ban). The parameter measuring the main
effect of the OZdi variable is λ1 and is to be measured
relative to the intercept λ0 (representing expected
baseline sales for NZ). The parameter λ2 is the main
effect of the time dummy representing the common
effect on sales coinciding with the period after De-
cember 2012. Similarly, the common effect of the
post–display ban period is captured by the parameter
λ3 on the DBt dummy variable. We adopt a set of con-
trols, T(i, t,Γ), with Γ a corresponding set of parame-
ters. The term Priceit is the category price per stick
of cigarettes in country i in period t. We will refer
to the variable Salesit−1 henceforth as Lag sales, with
parameter λ7.
The interaction of OZdi and PPt (the parameter λ5)
represents our empirical test of the plain packaging
effect on baseline sales quantity in Australia relative
to NZ. Similarly, the interaction of OZdi and DBt (the
parameter λ4) is the DiD effect of the display ban. We
ran a sequence of DiD analyses, the results of which
are reported in Table 3. The difference-in-differences
estimate for the plain packaging event (λ5) is given
by the row OZd × PP. We also include the DiD value
for the display ban enforced in NZ in July of 2012.
We begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mation of the basic DiD model with no controls in-
cluded [model (1)]. Although negative, the DiD effect
is not statistically signiﬁcant even at p< 0.10. Adding
prices to this speciﬁcation, however, we ﬁnd that
the DiD effect magnitude is −94.99 and statistically
significant at p< 0.05. In the remaining columns
of Table 3, we successively add more controls. In
model (2), we added category price; in model (3),
we added monthly ﬁxed effects; and in models (4)
Table 2. Common Trend Tests for Australia vs. NZ Using Only Data Prior to the Australian
PPM
Dependent variable: Unit sales (millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time trend −1.56*** −1.03 2.64* −0.83 −0.33 −0.39
(0.44) (0.83) (1.14) (0.74) (0.44) (0.40)
OZd −176.47* −106.77 −138.50 −96.82 24.38 9.36
(93.58) (126.31) (231.07) (131.46) (62.77) (81.35)
Placebo 12.33
(14.18)
October–December 2012 29.65* 30.96*
(15.11) (15.75)
DB −43.05 −32.39** −27.46***
(27.27) (11.54) (9.15)
Category price −488.87 −377.97 −567.17** −1,001.38** −1,039.71**
(347.87) (578.73) (267.02) (383.80) (397.26)
Time trend × OZd 1.09* 0.75 1.07 0.71 0.19 0.30
(0.62) (0.76) (1.16) (0.82) (0.35) (0.49)
OZd × Placebo −15.14
(34.60)
OZd × October–December 2012 −32.42* −33.82*
(17.54) (18.61)
OZd × DB 35.87 45.51*** 38.96
(33.53) (13.75) (22.99)
Constant 1,151.92*** 1,323.69*** 518.77** 1,335.36*** 1,537.92*** 1,567.05***
(65.21) (68.94) (217.54) (42.76) (135.90) (147.74)
Monthly ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.32 0.34 0.96 0.53 0.97 0.97
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 0.93 0.47 0.91 0.91
Notes. Common trend tests are reported based on data only prior to the PPM. Column (1) is a model with
only a time trend interacted with the OZd dummy. Column (2) adds category price. Column (3) uses data
only since the display ban and prior to the PPM. Column (4) uses the full pre-PPM period but adds the
display ban difference-in-differences effect. Column (5) adds monthly ﬁxed effects and a difference-in-
differences effect to account for the October–December restriction on manufacturing of branded packaging.
Column (6) tests the effect of a placebo difference-in-differences effect in the pre-PPM data. Robust au-
tocorrelation and heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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and (5) we add lagged sales. In model (5), we also
control for a difference in timing between the
manufacturing ban and sales ban of highly branded
packs. Column (6) is the same as column (5) but with-
out the lagged sales variable.
Our ﬁndings hold across these various speciﬁca-
tions: The plain packaging effect lowers the sales of
cigarettes in Australia. Furthermore, relative to the
constant term in the regressions, the magnitude is
quite stable and changes (although not statistically
signiﬁcantly) only when we include lagged sales
in the analysis. Computing the effect size, we ﬁnd
that the absolute drop in cigarette sticks for the
full control speciﬁcation including lag sales is −67.3
million (or −7.5% of average monthly sales observed
in 2012), and without lagged sales included it is
estimated at around −83.6 million (or −9.4%). The
difference between the estimates without lagged sales
versus with can be reconciled on the basis of the longer-
term effect on baseline sales carried through by the
lagged sales component on future baseline sales.
4.3. Robustness Tests
Several robustness tests were carried out. As we next
report, we ﬁnd that the size of the base estimate [we
used model (5) from Table 3] is stable across these
different robustness tests.
4.3.1. Accounting for Potential Price Endogeneity. We
tested robustness by instrumenting for price using
an instrumental variables (two-stage least squares
[2SLS]) approach. Although price is not the focus of
interest in this analysis, a concern about bias in this
parameter may spill over to the parameter of interest.
For instruments valid for prices, we use excise taxes
on cigarettes (typically measured in dollars per cig-
arette stick) and the U.S. retail price index. Data for
excise taxes from NZ are available from the Treasury
of NZ,7 and those for Australia they are available
from Scollo and Bayly (2018). Excise taxes are valid
instruments (the “exclusion” restriction) due to their
being set by the government for the purpose of reve-
nue generation, assuring their exogeneity. Excise taxes
Table 3. Difference-in-Differences Baseline Model, Estimated Using OLS, with Robust (Het-
eroscedastic and Autocorrelation Corrected) Standard Errors in Parentheses
Dependent variable: Unit sales (millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OZd −20.52 15.67 33.58 49.87* 49.86* 33.62
(17.31) (11.12) (23.67) (28.66) (29.07) (24.15)
PP 25.07* 109.14*** 80.20*** 66.59*** 66.60** 80.86***
(14.10) (17.60) (18.38) (22.40) (28.42) (24.17)
DB −106.61*** −74.55*** −63.65*** −43.13*** −43.14** −64.18***
(15.09) (9.27) (14.26) (14.29) (16.28) (8.91)
Category price −831.98*** −707.92*** −574.88** −574.98** −708.72***
(183.93) (196.50) (234.95) (247.26) (207.74)
Lag sales 0.29 0.29
(0.24) (0.24)
October–December 2012 −0.001 1.11
(15.82) (17.28)
OZd × PP −25.95 −94.99*** −81.74*** −66.32*** −67.26** −83.62***
(18.86) (17.86) (16.29) (21.66) (27.86) (21.81)
OZd × DB 85.49*** 64.56*** 57.48*** 39.43*** 40.37** 59.26***
(17.46) (10.13) (13.76) (13.65) (16.01) (9.60)
OZd × October–December 2012 −1.87 −3.58
(17.79) (19.38)
Constant 928.56*** 1,350.37*** 1,330.12*** 963.99*** 964.16** 1,330.52***
(16.56) (92.60) (104.21) (352.21) (364.46) (110.05)
Effect size (%) −2.9 −10.7 −9.2 −7.4 −7.5 −9.4
Monthly ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged sales No No No Yes Yes No
October–December 2012 No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.39 0.52 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.89
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.48 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.82
Notes. All models report OLS results for the DiDmodel in Equation (1). Column (1) reports the OLS regression
results with only DiD effects. Column (2) adds category prices. Column (3) includes monthly ﬁxed effects.
Column (4) adds lag sales. Column (5) is the full speciﬁcation. Column (6) removes lag sales from the model in
column (5). Robust autocorrelation and heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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also represent a large proportion of retail price. There
is also considerable precedent for using excise taxes for
prices of cigarettes (e.g., Gruber et al. 2003). Further-
more, Stock and Watson 2012, chapter 12) use excise
taxes for endogeneity of prices in cigarette demand as
a textbook illustration for instrumental variable se-
lection, arguing that “[t]hose choices about public
ﬁnance are driven by political considerations, not by
factors related to the demand for cigarettes” (Stock
and Watson 2012, p. 480). Although it cannot be de-
nied that excise taxes are designed to raise prices and
increase the cost (and therefore reduce demand) of
smoking, we found evidence to suggest that excise tax
increases are implemented to raise funds for other
purposes as well. For example, as noted in a press re-
lease by Australian member of parliament and then
treasurer Chris Bowen (Bowen and Plibersek 2013),
such purposes are particularly to cover health costs,
but also to help federal budgets increase their sur-
pluses (or reduce deﬁcits).
The other instrument used is a seasonally adjusted
U.S. retail price index for cigarettes, city average for
all urban consumers, available from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. The validity of the U.S. retail price
index as an instrument is based on this being a
Hausman-style instrument (see, e.g., Nevo 2001) that
captures common cost shocks experienced globally
by cigarette brands, typically arising from common
global energy, labor and capital cost, transportation,
and commodity price shocks. There is some possi-
bility they may have a more direct effect on demand
because of correlated global demand, so we tested
that and found a weak correlation of 0.22 in annual
GDP growth (data from the World Bank) between
Australia and the United States, with that from 1961
to 2017 being not statistically signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero (p< 0.05). Further testing of just the
period from 2001 to 2012 (before the PPM) also does
not reject the test of zero correlation among the
countries.
In the three columns of Table 4, we report the ﬁrst-
stage regressions (i.e., category price regressed onto
instruments and exogenous variables) to assess the
strength and face validity of these instruments. In
terms of strength, the F-statistics of these instruments
in the 2SLS regression are F(1,46) = 159.47 for the excise
tax variable alone, F(1,46) = 22.59 for the U.S. cigarette
price index alone, and F(2,45) = 88.54 for both instru-
ments combined. Each of these F-statistics is well
above the rule of thumb of 10 suggested by Stock et al.
(2002), as a test to assure that minimal bias effect
remains. Exogeneity of these instruments can be
assessed on the basis of the Sargan overidentiﬁcation
test [only for both instruments combined and under
2SLS; see model (3) in Table 5], which is χ2 = 0.717
not rejected for these instruments (p> 0.1). In terms of
face validity of the ﬁrst stage, both excise tax and U.S.
price have the expected positive impact on retail
prices, with excise tax appearing to have a larger effect
size thanU.S. price changes.U.S. price has a smaller size
impact than excise taxes. Excise taxes for Australia (the
parameter for Excise tax × OZd) have a smaller ab-
solute impact on prices than those of NZ.
Using these instruments, in Table 5 we ﬁnd that
the size of the plain packaging effect changes by a
small amount when accounting for potential price
endogeneity. The Wu–Hausman χ2 test statistics are
14.90 (p < 0.01) for both of the instruments (excise
taxes and U.S. prices), 7.526 (p < 0.01) for excise taxes
alone, and 12.41 (p < 0.01) for the U.S. cigarette price
index alone. These tests do indicate the presence of
endogeneity remaining in the price variable after we
control for many observables. We do see a substantial
decline (i.e., attenuated toward zero) in price sensitivity
when using instruments. However, none of these tests
resulted ina result for theDiDeffectqualitativelydifferent
Table 4. First-Stage Regressions for 2SLS Demonstrating
Strength for Each of the Instruments in Isolation and
Combined
(1) (2) (3)
Excise tax U.S. price Both
OZd 0.0265 0.0339 0.0292
(0.0195) (0.0291) (0.0196)
PP 0.0138* 0.0699*** 0.0148*
(0.00795) (0.0122) (0.00847)
OZd × PP 0.00121 −0.101*** −0.0109
(0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0111)
October–December 2012 0.00808*** 0.0287** 0.0115***
(0.00260) (0.0126) (0.00392)
OZd × October–December
2012
0.00295 −0.0219 0.000125
(0.00964) (0.0152) (0.00903)
DB −0.000867 −0.0116 −0.00252
(0.00917) (0.0166) (0.00977)
OZd × DB 0.0144* −0.00919 0.00782
(0.00850) (0.0178) (0.00923)
Lag sales 0.000141 −0.0000371 0.000170
(0.000124) (0.000190) (0.000129)
Excise tax 1.597*** 1.401***
(0.126) (0.142)
U.S. price 1.784*** 0.459***
(0.375) (0.111)
Constant −0.127 −1.364** −0.587***
(0.167) (0.533) (0.204)
Monthly ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 78 78 78
F-statistic 159.47 22.59 88.54
Notes. The ﬁrst two columns report ﬁrst-stage results for each in-
strument in isolation. The third column reports the results for both
instruments combined. Robust autocorrelation and heteroscedastic
adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable
is category price.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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from that of the baseline model. The limited informa-
tion maximum likelihood (LIML) estimate [model (4) in
Table 5] indicates that the effect of plain packaging is
very similar to that in the baseline model, and price
estimates are similar to those using 2SLS estimation,
which does not suggest any weak instrument issue.
Finally, the last column runs the DiD regression with
covariates added for excise tax and U.S. prices. Al-
though the size of the effect drops a little, and its
statistical signiﬁcance is reduced (but still signiﬁcant
at p< 0.10), we get some assurance of the expected
sign for the U.S. price and excise tax instruments.
We report the results of the next few robustness
tests in Table 6:
1. Functional form assumptions. Included in these
robustness tests, we redid our baseline analysis using
a log-linear model, where the PPM DiD estimate is
interpreted as a percentage value. We also tried adding
a polynomial (cubic) to allow for time trends. As Table 6
indicates, our results are robust to these changes.
2. Using only post–NZ display ban data. Next, we
shortened the time series to include only data from
after the display ban in NZ. Testing a DiD speciﬁca-
tion using only data since the NZ display ban [see re-
sults for models (4) and (5) in Table 6] increases the
size of the effect (and naturally also the standard
error). However, the effect size remains statistically
signiﬁcant.
Table 5. Results for the Baseline Model Estimated with 2SLS and LIML, Instrumenting for
Category Price, Suggest that Some Endogeneity Bias Exists but Affects Mainly the Price
Sensitivity Parameter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2SLS tax 2SLS U.S. price 2SLS both LIML Reduced form
Category price −493.1*** −582.3*** −505.8*** −505.1* −1123.3***
(174.2) (151.5) (168.7) (100.3) (651.8)
OZd 48.23 50.01* 48.48 48.47*** 65.05
(30.61) (28.25) (30.26) (15.08) (26.64)
PP 57.28*** 67.43*** 58.72*** 58.64*** 66.00***
(19.29) (17.63) (18.76) (16.73) (26.64)
OZd × PP −58.78*** −68.02*** −60.09*** −60.02*** −58.60*
(18.82) (17.19) (18.34) (20.17) (29.54)
October–December 2012 −1.793 0.159 −1.516 −1.532 3.47
(11.84) (12.14) (11.87) (16.62) (17.99)
October–December 2012 × OZd 0.0698 −2.040 −0.230 −0.212 1.79
(14.45) (14.63) (14.46) (23.58) (17.48)
DB −42.39*** −43.20*** −42.50*** −42.50*** −43.01**
(14.37) (13.49) (14.24) (13.99) (14.22)
DB × OZd 38.89*** 40.50*** 39.12*** 39.10** 47.64**
(14.04) (13.15) (13.90) (18.25) (16.01)
Lag sales 0.324* 0.287* 0.319* 0.319*** 0.41*
(0.178) (0.161) (0.175) (0.0903) (0.179)
Excise tax 997.00
(889.1)
U.S. price 21.9
(438.44)
Constant 888.5*** 970.9*** 900.2*** 899.5*** 786.3
(262.1) (233.2) (256.8) (124.6) (474.9)
Monthly ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.903 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.910
Adjusted R2 0.838 0.840 0.839 0.839 0.840
Sargan χ2 0.717
Sargan p-value 0.397
Wu–Hausman χ2 7.526*** 12.41*** 14.90***
Wu–Hausman p-value 0.00608 0.000427 0.000582
Notes. The ﬁrst two columns report regression results correcting for price endogeneity using each instrument
in isolation. The third column reports the results for both instruments combined. The fourth column reports
results for the limited information maximum likelihood model. The last column reports reduced form OLS
estimates, adding excise tax and U.S. price as covariates to the baseline model. Robust autocorrelation and
heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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3. Placebo intervention. A potential issue associated
with using time series variation to establish a causal
effect is the presence of other temporal factors
that could be masquerading as the effect of the in-
tervention. In our case, this is mitigated by the
inclusion of ﬂexible time effects (see above robust-
ness results). Furthermore, the common trend analy-
sis reported previously is also reassuring in this regard.
Nevertheless, we further investigate this issue. Spe-
ciﬁcally, using data only on the preintervention pe-
riod, we introduced a placebo intervention for the
monthsApril to June of 2012. The results are reported
in column (6) of Table 2. Once again, this analysis did
not reveal the presence of non-intervention-related
temporal affects; that is, we ﬁnd the placebo in-
tervention to be statistically insigniﬁcant and also
not large in magnitude.
4.4. Potential Mechanisms for Changes in Behavior
As noted in the literature review, product packaging
serves as a means of differentiating products in the
market. The PPM then lowers differentiation, which
can make consumers more price elastic. Another di-
mension along which brands are differentiated is the
number of variants they carry; PPM might have also
affected consumer sensitivity to these variants. Such
responses to marketing mix variables can be short
term or long term, or a combination of the two. The
short-term effects reﬂect the impact on the immediate
purchase, suggesting an effect at the point of sale,
whereas the long-term effects are indicative of a more
persistent effect on sales. In this section, we turn to
look at data at the brand (not the category) level to
shed some light on the potential mechanisms driving
the results identiﬁed in the previous section.
Table 6. Results from Robustness Checks for the Difference-in-Differences Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time trend Cubic Logged cubic DB = 1 DB = 1, logged
Category price −324.4 −646.9*** −0.390*** −657.7*** −0.481***
(209.9) (217.0) (0.131) (158.5) (0.103)
OZd 34.07 33.11 16.73*** 71.95*** 16.51***
(33.72) (25.49) (2.914) (11.06) (2.497)
PP 55.83*** 54.42*** 0.0623*** 159.1*** 0.178***
(19.10) (15.99) (0.0170) (26.42) (0.0282)
OZd × PP −43.01** −78.06*** −0.0817*** −74.35*** −0.0918***
(21.91) (22.64) (0.0232) (19.08) (0.0208)
October–December 2012 −5.946 −6.021 −0.00167 27.36 0.0328*
(12.14) (12.96) (0.0139) (17.15) (0.0185)
October–December 2012 × OZd 4.212 −1.622 −0.00433 13.24 0.00862
(14.89) (15.89) (0.0172) (18.06) (0.0197)
DB −39.10*** −57.86*** −0.0617***
(13.83) (19.10) (0.0203)
DB × OZd 50.25*** 60.63*** 0.0674***
(16.01) (13.56) (0.0146)
Time trend −0.427** 12.62 0.00515 235.3** 0.269**
(0.214) (22.28) (0.0234) (104.6) (0.117)
Time trend2 15.75*** 0.0144*** −689.7*** −0.758***
(5.525) (0.00533) (173.9) (0.197)
Time trend3 −7.518 −0.00500 376.7*** 0.413***
(9.911) (0.0104) (84.72) (0.0955)
Lag sales 0.193 −0.0268 −0.0108 −0.0439 0.00554
(0.197) (0.184) (0.177) (0.155) (0.151)
Constant 997.0*** 1317.3*** 4.195*** 1189.9*** 3.969***
(265.3) (277.7) (0.753) (94.20) (0.603)
Monthly ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes No No
N 78 78 78 40 40
R2 0.90 0.92 0.99 0.88 0.99
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.86 0.99 0.84 0.99
Notes. Including a polynomial time trend component for both linear and log models yields similar ﬁndings, and shortening the data series to
only after the NZ display ban increases the size of the plain packaging effect. In each case, the dependent variable is unit sales. Column (1)
includes a linear time trend, and column (2) has a cubic time trend. Column (3) uses a log-linear model where both unit sales and prices are
logged, and also includes the cubic time trend. Columns (4) and (5) both use data only since theNZdisplay banwas introduced. Column (4) is the
linear model (unlogged unit sales) with the cubic trend, and column (5) is the log-linear model. Robust autocorrelation and heteroscedastic
adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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Before proceeding with such an analysis, however,
several issues are worth highlighting. First, if price
sensitivity changed with the PPM, then, in principle,
we can include a three-way interaction effect in our
previous DiD analysis between price, the Australia
dummy, and the PPM variable to reﬂect this possi-
bility. Although we did include such an interaction,
and found that it directionally supported our hy-
pothesis, the short time series and aggregate country-
level variation did not afford us the statistical power
to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant effect across various
model speciﬁcations. With brand level data, we can
leverage the additional cross-sectional price variation
to better assess our hypothesis of increased price
sensitivity. The second issue pertains to brand vari-
ants. If these inﬂuence brand shares, the issue arises
as to why we did not test their effect at the category
level. One reason is the absence of appropriate brand-
speciﬁc data for the NZ market. Instead, we assessed
whether the total number of variants (i.e., the sum of
variants across each of the brands in the cigarette
category) was a signiﬁcant driver of category sales
using the above category data only for Australia. We
found a very small and statistically insigniﬁcant ef-
fect, so our category analyses excluded this variable.
A related issue we face when looking at the number of
variants at the brand level is that some of the brands
show no changes over time in the number of branded
variants they have, so they cannot be directly in-
cluded in the analysis. Therefore, we operationalize
this variable as the proportion (or share) of variants
for each brand in each time period. This generates
some variation, although, as we show below, the
number of variants continues to have a very small
effect even at the brand level.
To understand how sensitivity to price and variant
share may have changed after the PPM, we build a
brand-level unit sales response model, calibrated on
data for Australia. Because data are available at the
channel level (grocery and convenience), we study
brand sales in each channel over time. In the brand
response model, we study the interaction of the plain
packaging dummy variable with each of the price
and variant share sensitivity parameters. We con-
sidered two model speciﬁcations: the ﬁrst is an error-
correctionmodel (ECM; for details, see Fok et al. 2006,
van Heerde et al. 2013). This model allows us to
measure each of the long- and short-term effects of
the variables. The second model is a more conven-
tional linear sales response model along the lines
that we used in the difference-in-differences analysis
above. Because the ECM generalizes the linear model
(in log terms), we focus on that speciﬁcation here and
report the results from the other functional form in the
online appendix.
For each channel, we specify a set of B equations
(b  1, . . . ,B), with sales for brand b at time t being
represented by (omitting channel subscripts)
Δ lnSalesbt
 β0b+T(b, t,Λ) +β1bΔ lnPricebt
+β2bΔ lnComp pricebt+β3bΔ lnVariantsbt+ϕb
× lnSalesbt−1−β4b lnPriceb,t−1
β5b lnVariantsb,t−1−β6b lnComp priceb,t−1
( )
+bt,
(2)
whereΔ is a ﬁrst difference operator (e.g.,Δ lnPricet 
lnPricet − lnPricet−1), Price is the deﬂated price, and
Variants is the number of variants expressed as a
share of the total variants available at that point in
time. The term “comp” is used to denote average
competing brands’ values for the same marketing
mix variable. For example, Comp price is the average
value of the competing brands’ prices. Because we use
brand variant share, we do not require any variable
for competing brands’ variants. The error term is
jointly normally distributed (bt ∼ N(0,Σ)), capturing
cross-brand covariation. (For more complete details,
see Fok et al. 2006 or van Heerde et al. 2013.) The
“error correction” component is in the parentheses and
is premultiplied by ϕ. The ϕ parameter represents a
“speed of adjustment” toward a long-term equilib-
rium in any change of the variables included in the
parentheses. This parameter value is identiﬁed from
the lagged sales covariate ln Salesbt−1. While we ini-
tially obtain values for the product of ϕ and various β
parameters, we obtain the latter by dividing through
by ϕ and applying the delta method to calculate
standard errors of this ratio. For the time component,
T(b, t,Λ), we include a trend component and the ﬁrst
of the harmonic basis functions (a more parsimoni-
ous representation than ﬁxed effects for individual
months). This ﬁrst harmonic function will account for
intrayear cyclical effects (e.g., seasonality). The pa-
rameters β1b and β3b account for short-term price and
variant share, and β4b and β5b, respectively, represent
the corresponding long-term effects. Short- and long-
term sales responses to competitive prices are cap-
tured by the parameters β2b and β6b, respectively.
We selected the top brands (a total of 13), and we
added to this the quality-tier-speciﬁc composites of
all other brands. (Cigarettes are considered by man-
ufacturers to be classiﬁable into three quality tiers:
value, mainstream, and premium.) This means we
have a total of 13 + 3 = 16 different brands inclusive of
the composites. The brand-speciﬁc data represent
around 99.2% of the total sales of cigarettes across the
two channels. The top three brands (Winﬁeld, Long-
beach, and Peter Jackson) represent collectively around
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50% of the volume share of the category, with leading
share brand (Winﬁeld) having an average of 21% share.
The 13 noncomposite brands collectively represent
93.7% of the market share (the composites with 5.5%).
An assumption justifying the use of error correc-
tion methods is stationarity of the time series. We
therefore conducted several tests for stationarity. Con-
sistent with evidence available in past literature on
packaged goods, and particularly for error correction
models (e.g., van Heerde et al. 2013), we ﬁnd evidence
for stationarity for each of the sales, variant share, and
price time series variables. The tests we conducted
were as follows. Unit root tests for individual time
series [the test by Phillips and Perron (1988) and that
by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) with intercept, lags, and
trend included] suggest stationarity for all brands
in the convenience channel, and for 15 out of the 16
sales series in the grocery channel. Panel-based unit root
tests have more power, so we apply these tests to the
system of equations in (3) set up as a panel. These include
the Levin et al. (2002) test with brand-speciﬁc in-
tercepts and trends, as suggested by van Heerde et al.
(2013), rejected for grocery (z = −3.73, p = 0.00019) and
convenience (z = −5.19, p = 2.1e-07) channels. A panel-
based unit root test that takes into account that errors
may be correlated between brands is the Im et al.
(2003) test. For this test, we ﬁnd that, with brand-
speciﬁc intercepts and trends, for the grocery channel,
z = −3.44 and p = 0.00058, and for the convenience
channel, z = −4.07 and p = 4.7e−05. Both are rejected,
ﬁnding evidence for stationarity. For additional ro-
bustness, we also ran the model in (3) using a simple
log-linear but non-error-correcting speciﬁcation. The
only “dynamics” included in that model were con-
trol variables for time trend and lagged unit sales.
The main results for the brand response models are
presented in Table 7.8 All estimates have considerable
face validity, with positive (but low) response to variant
share, low negative own price elasticities, and positive
cross price elasticities. Prices are inelastic (i.e., below one
in absolute value), consistent with past work on tobacco
and other vice goods (e.g., Baltagi and Grifﬁn 1995,
Gallet and List 2003, Chen et al. 2009). Although low,
these estimated price elasticities are consistent with past
meta-analytic work (e.g., Bijmolt et al. 2005). The low
price elasticities before the PPM indicate that brands
were relatively impervious to price changes, indicative
of a likely combination of high levels of perceived dif-
ferentiation and low primary demand sensitivity to
price. The latter we established earlier in our DiD
results.
The bottom four rows of Table 7 present results for
how much each of the short- and long-term pricing
and variant share effectiveness changed after the
PPM.We discuss only the last two columns and focus
attention more on the grocery channel as indicative of
any major changes in the market, owing to the larger
share of sales volume this channel accounts for. From
these results we see that price sensitivity, both in the
long term and short term, increased signiﬁcantly
(p< 0.05). We do not see any change in short- or long-
term sensitivity to variant share. Indeed, there ap-
pears to be little effect of variants on share except
perhaps in the convenience channel. Although the
convenience channel accounts for a smaller fraction
of total sales, there is a similar increase in price sen-
sitivity for the long run. However, the short-term price
effectiveness declines (toward zero) in that channel.
To understand where the main changes may be
coming from, in Table 8 we present results split by
type of brand based on the quality tiers.We focus here
on baseline sales effects and sales responses to prices
and variant share. We ﬁrst note (see row PP) that
baseline sales declined in premium and mainstream
brands (particularly in the grocery channel), but in-
creased toward value brands. This suggests a shift in
sales toward such value brands. This is consistent
with the removal of the ability for consumers to
distinguish between such classiﬁcations other than by
price. We further observe that both long- and short-
term price sensitivity for premium and mainstream
brands increased substantially.
Overall, the brand results suggest that consumers
became more price sensitive after the PPM, consistent
with a lower perceived differentiation among brands.
The results averaged by product type suggest that
consumers became more price sensitive, especially in
the premium and mainstream segments of the market
(Table 8, last two rows). Premium products have
higher perceived differentiation before the PPM, so
such products are likely to see a greater reduction in
perceived differentiation, and therefore a larger in-
crease in price sensitivity. Another explanation for
the differential impact of premium and mainstream
brands lies in attracting new smokers to the category.
New customers tend to be drawn to this category
because of the glamor and visibility of consumption
of products in social settings (e.g., Machado and
Sinha 2007).9 In such settings, we suspect that pre-
mium and mainstream brands are more likely to be
inﬂuential than value brands. However, after the
PPM, the ability for brands to transfer this brand
equity by social contagion is likely to be signiﬁcantly
thwarted, simply because brands are not as distinc-
tive and memorable as they were before the PPM.
Two possible bright spots for tobacco marketers
appear to be the value brands and the convenience
channel, where price sensitivities did not go up. For
value brands, however, with low prices and preex-
isting higher price elasticities (particularly long term),
it may be more difﬁcult to bring about proﬁtable
price reductions because of lower margins (e.g., see
Bonfrer et al.: Sales Impact of Plain Packaging Regulation for Cigarettes
Marketing Science, 2020, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 234–252, © 2019 The Author(s) 247
Dreze et al. 1994), and these segment effects do not
outweigh the negative effects at the higher end of the
market and in the larger grocery channel. One inter-
esting potential explanation for the decline in short-run
price sensitivity for the convenience channel is as follows.
The convenience channel is where new smokers incu-
bate—they tend to be “social” smokers at ﬁrst, and
because they do not know the category, they use higher
prices as a signalmorewhen the brand elements are taken
away. This explanation is consistent with the low price
sensitivity in this channel prior to the PPM, particularly
for premium brands (see the columns for convenience in
Table 7).
4.5. Implications for Public Policy
Our analysis suggests that the plain packaging mea-
sure was an effective policy intervention in terms of
decreasing cigarette sales, and our results also sug-
gest a post-PPM increase in price sensitivity. Fur-
thermore, any policy that results in increases in prices
(e.g., excise tax) may have increased potency in its
ability to reduce the quantity demanded after the PPM,
Table 7. Price Sensitivity Increased After the PPM Both in the Short and Long Term, but Is Not Sensitive to Variant Share
Dependent variable: Brand unit sales
No PP interaction PP for price Full PP interaction
Grocery Convenience Grocery Convenience Grocery Convenience
Intercept −0.03*** 0.02* −0.04*** 0.02 −0.05*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PP −0.01** −0.00 −0.04*** 0.02** −0.02*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
October–December 2012 −0.01 −0.00 −0.02** 0.01 −0.02** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time trend −0.01 −0.01 −0.04*** −0.03*** −0.05*** −0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag sales −0.35*** −0.16*** −0.51*** −0.25*** −0.57*** −0.28***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Short-term price −1.52*** −1.52*** −0.75*** −0.15 −0.76*** −0.22
(0.17) (0.21) (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19)
Short-term variants −0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Short-term competitive price 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.54*** 0.87*** 0.64*** 1.06***
(0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.25) (0.21) (0.33)
Long-term price −3.16*** −4.61*** −1.76*** −2.93*** −1.88*** −3.45***
(0.42) (0.96) (0.29) (0.69) (0.31) (0.80)
Long-term variants −0.05 0.45*** 0.00 0.15* −0.01 0.11
(0.06) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13)
Long-term competitive price 2.42*** 3.52*** 1.48*** 2.26*** 1.55*** 2.78***
(0.40) (0.92) (0.28) (0.64) (0.30) (0.77)
PP × Short-term price −0.51*** 1.02*** −0.47*** 0.97***
(0.13) (0.19) (0.15) (0.22)
PP × Short-term variants 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.06)
PP × Long-term price −0.89*** −0.64** −0.73*** −0.56*
(0.15) (0.28) (0.16) (0.31)
PP × Long-term variants 0.07 0.23
(0.13) (0.22)
Seasonal harmonic effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
McElroy’s R2 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.69
Likelihood ratio 1,078.3*** 939.6*** 1,088.5*** 862.7*** 1,047.4*** 854.6***
J-statistic 4.81 4.95 4.51 4.50 3.87 3.72
χ2 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96
Number of observations 928 928 928 928 928 928
Notes. Estimation results for the error correction model in Equation (3) are shown. Reported estimates are averages across brands within
channels. The ﬁrst two columns are models estimated without interactions with the plain packaging dummy variable. The middle two columns
include the PPM interaction only for prices, and the last two columns include full interaction for both long- and short-term variants and prices.
Robust autocorrelation and heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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certainly at the top end of the market and through the
grocery channel. We speculate that this is a plausible
outcome of the PPM.
To put the main effect of the PPM into perspective,
we consider the retail price change it would take to
decrease sales by the expected amount of 67 million
(7.5%). With price elasticity deﬁned as ηp  %ΔSales/
%ΔPrice, and given the pre-PPM price elasticity, a
target price change%ΔPrice*, required to bring about
a target percentage change in sales of %ΔSales*, is
given by %ΔPrice*  %ΔSales*/ηp. Given the esti-
mated category sales price elasticity of −0.39 [see the
results for the log-linearmodel in column (5) of Table 6],
the target price change to bring about a 7.5% decline
in demand is equal to 0.075/0.39 = 19.2%. This is a
substantial increase in price, likely requiring major
increases in excise taxes to it bring about. However,
there may also be other qualitative reasons that plain
packaging brings about a more favorable outcome
than that of price increases. For example, consumer
welfare arguments could be made that the higher
prices tend to hit consumers with lower socioeco-
nomic status more severely, consumers considered to
be more vulnerable, with higher prevalence rates
and lower capability to quit smoking. Another reason
why plain packaging may be a more appealing mecha-
nism in the public policy arsenal is that it is less likely
than excise taxes to affect votes by smokers at elec-
tion time.
Starting on March 14, 2018, NZ implemented a
similar plain packaging policy, meaning that to-
bacco companies in NZwere subsequently not able to
manufacture and sell cigarettes in branded packag-
ing. Can we use the results from our Australia analysis
to predict the potential implications of PPM for NZ?
From Euromonitor’s Passport database (Euromonitor
Passport 2018b), sales of cigarettes in NZ in 2017were
1.8 billion sticks. From our results, and under con-
ditions comparable with Australia at the time they
introduced the PPM, if NZ were to implement plain
Table 8. Sales Shift from Premium to Value Products, Particularly in the Grocery Channel
Dependent variable: Brand unit sales
Grocery Convenience
Value Mainstream Premium Value Mainstream Premium
Intercept −0.00 0.39*** −0.28*** −0.02 0.35*** −0.00
(0.01) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03)
PP 0.02* −0.08*** −0.06*** 0.08*** −0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
October–December 2012 0.01 −0.04*** −0.02* 0.01 −0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Time trend 0.06*** −0.09*** −0.09*** −0.05* −0.03* −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Lag sales −0.25*** −1.01*** −0.59*** −0.15*** −0.45*** −0.29***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Short-term price −0.75*** −0.62*** −0.82*** −0.53* −0.13 0.20
(0.17) (0.22) (0.16) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27)
Short-term variants −0.03 0.10 0.00 0.08 −0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Short-term competitive price 1.32*** 0.06 0.10 1.86*** 0.40 0.09
(0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.41) (0.40) (0.52)
Long-term price −6.44*** −0.35 −0.67 −7.07*** −1.69** −1.03
(1.25) (0.28) (0.40) (2.15) (0.68) (1.07)
Long-term variants 0.00 0.09* −0.09 0.70** −0.04 0.06
(0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.34) (0.13) (0.09)
Long-term competitive price 6.23*** 0.13 0.45 6.82*** 1.15* 0.09
(1.24) (0.26) (0.39) (2.07) (0.64) (1.00)
PP × Short-term price −0.02 −0.68** −0.86*** 1.35*** 0.77** 0.94***
(0.21) (0.28) (0.19) (0.37) (0.31) (0.29)
PP × Long-term price −0.09 −0.66*** −1.11*** 0.54 −0.61** −0.72*
(0.51) (0.13) (0.22) (1.17) (0.24) (0.38)
Notes. Only for grocery did price sensitivity increase more for premium and mainstream brands. For convenience, short-term price sensitivity
decreased for all brand types, and long-term price sensitivity increased for only value and premium products. Estimation results are based on
Table 7. The dependent variable here is brand-level unit sales within each channel. The averages for these results are taken across brands within
product segments. Robust autocorrelation and heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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packaging, we expect a decline of 7.5% in category
sales volume. In particular, the prevalence rate in
Australia was 0.194 at the time the Australian PPM
was introduced in December of 2012. Given that preva-
lence in NZwas 0.166 (Euromonitor Passport 2018c) at
the time of the NZ PPM implementation, we should
adjust for the lower prevalence rate. We accomplish
this by multiplying the anticipated decline by the
lower fraction of smokers (a factor of 0.166/0.194).
Thus, the anticipated decline in NZ sales volume is
0.166/0.194 × 0.075 × 1.8 billion, which equates to 115
million annually, or around 9.6 million sticks per
month. In 2017 excise tax rates of NZD 0.74 per stick,
the annual excise tax revenue from cigarettes would
be expected to decline by around NZD 85.4 million.
More importantly, assuming a similar proportionate
decline in incidence rates, from a base of 603,000
smokers in NZ in 2017 (Euromonitor International
2017), we would expect a decline in the smoking
population of around 0.166/0.194 × 0.075 = 0.064
(6.4%). This further translates into 38,600 fewer
smokers (0.064 × 603,000). The annual decline in
excise taxes must be offset against the lower socie-
tal cost imposed by 38,600 fewer smokers such as
lower health costs. Although we recognize that our
results are not intended as precise estimates, they
nevertheless give an indicative metric of what the
impact might be in that country.
4.5.1. Implications for Manufacturers. Although we
cannot necessarily attribute causality to changes in
manufacturer actions after the introduction of the
PPM, it is interesting to see how they changed the use
of the major marketing tools still at their disposal.
These data may provide interesting insights to reg-
ulators. For example, it may be used to forecast
whether changes in excise are fully passed through
to consumers, partially absorbed, or ampliﬁed. Over-
all, weighted (by volume) prices in the three months
after the introduction of the PPM were 1.9% higher
than those in the three months before. This varies by
market segment with, grocery and convenience stores
being 2.1% and 0.4% higher, and the premium, main-
stream, and value quality segments being 1.2%, 2.2%,
and 1.2% higher, respectively. The other major mar-
keting tool available to manufacturers, the number of
brandvariants,decreased after the PPM,with a decrease
of 8% in the three months after, relative to that before.
Corresponding changes in the number of variants by
segment are 7.3% and 12% lower for grocery and
convenience stores, and 3.8%, 4.8%, and 14.0% lower
for premium, mainstream, and value, respectively.
Manufacturers of cigarettes have repeatedly stated
that their objective is not to grow category sales, but
to maximize proﬁts by trying to grow/maintain price
and margins (Chaloupka et al. 2002). Our results
indicate that the bright spots for manufacturers are the
value segment in the market and the convenience
channel. Going forward,wewould expect companies to
focus their efforts on these aspects of the market. By the
same token, policy makers should also be vigilant re-
garding potential moves that ﬁrms may make in the
value segment and in the convenience store channel,
perhaps explicitly aimed at gaining share that may end
up having category demand effects.
5. Conclusions
Policy makers and regulators have to make and
evaluate decisions based on imperfect information,
both before policies are introduced and often soon
after they have been implemented. The implications
of these evaluations may cross jurisdictions, forming
the basis of other countries’ actions. For example,
based on early analysis of PPM effects, the United
Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Hungary, Ireland,
and Slovenia have followed Australia’s lead. This
paper aims to show how, using the best data available
in a given policy setting, we can ascertain the most
accurate view of the effects of a regulatory inter-
vention. The mandated plain packaging of tobacco
products by Australia gives us a rare opportunity to
learn more about what role packaging can play in
differentiated product markets. Based on data we
obtained on sales, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction of
around 60 to 70 million sticks monthly in quantity
sold. We also report several important effects of the
plain packaging regulation on sales response to
marketingmix elements remaining under the control of
marketers of tobacco products: pricing, variants, and
distribution channels. Our main insight is that of an
increase in price sensitivities, borne largely by the
grocery channel and in the longer-term effectiveness of
pricing. We ﬁnd some evidence that price sensitivities
across different segments of products converge after the
PPM, with differences among brand types typically
seen in differentiated products less prevalent. Collec-
tively, our ﬁndings are consistent with the valuable role
that packaging plays in a differentiated goods market,
and that removal of the ability for ﬁrms to differentiate
via distinctive branding elements via distinctive
branding elements on packaging has a deleterious
effect on brands’ ability to garner higher sales overall.
We ﬁnd this mechanism to be at play and likely to
underlie the decline in post-PPM baseline sales that
we observe across our analyses.
We acknowledge that the richness of our conclu-
sions and insights are limited by data constraints, but
that is the problem facing regulators who do not
control the products in the market. Nevertheless,
we believe valuable insights can already be gleaned
from the Australian experience. One advantage of our
study is the use of sales data, both before and after
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the introduction of a PPM and for a similar market.
A corresponding disadvantage is the limited length
of time window in which to examine changes in
cigarette sales. Given the addictive nature of ciga-
rettes, once consumers enter the market, it is difﬁcult
for them to leave. This suggests that long-term effects
may be larger than short-term effects. Sales volume
will vary somewhat fromactual consumption because
of possible changes in inventory levels, but we do not
expect this to be a major factor. Finally, although
using NZ as a control for Australia has a long pedi-
gree, andwewere careful to control for changes in the
NZ market, it may not represent a perfect control for
omitted factors in the Australian market. We expect
interesting future research to come out of other data
sets, including those derived from future countries
adopting plain packaging. To the extent that our
study can be replicated in these contexts, interesting
empirical generalizations about the effectiveness of
public policy can be drawn, in particular, on how
different instruments can work together to achieve
socially beneﬁcial outcomes.
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Endnotes
1 For details, see http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing
.nsf/content/tobacco-plain (accessed August 20, 2018).
2We assume a consumption average of 500 sticks per month
(Euromonitor International 2017), and that the decline in smoking
after the PPM is mainly due to lower incidence rates.
3 See http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco
(accessed December 1, 2018).
4Prevalence is the percentage of the population that are self-reported
regular smokers.
5As of December 1, 2012, AUD 1 = USD 1.04.
6 See http://www.tcdata.org.NZ (accessed August 16, 2016).
7 For example, see https://treasury.govt.NZ/publications/tax-outturn
-data/tax-outturn-data-september-2018 (accessed November 30, 2018).
8As with prior work, we aggregate and calculate weighted means of
the coefﬁcients, and standard errors are calculated with Rosenthal’s
(1991) method of adding Z values. The delta method to obtain the
standard error (s.e.) for the ratio of two estimates (θX and θY, with
corresponding s.e. σX and σY) is as follows:
s.e.
θX
θY
( )
 θX
θY
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
σ2X
θ2X
+ σ
2
Y
θ2Y
− 2 σX,Y
θXθY
√
.
9Having not fully developed into a habit comprising of considerably
higher levels of consumption and its commensurate ﬁnancial budget,
such new customers are more able to purchase or afford the premium
products.
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